

13 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: SAC U-2 Operations Over North Vietnam from
the Philippines

1. It is now possible to piece together partial information on the above subject as follows:

a. On 7 February CINCPAC requested JCS to provide U-2 coverage on targets 41 and 48 for Op Plan Tiger 34-A;

b. We have no knowledge in CIA of what actions were taken within the Pentagon or at JCS level to consider this matter. CIA was not informed or consulted;

c. CINCPAC was subsequently informed by JCS that a SAC U-2 was underway. Admiral Felt then asked why this was being serviced by SAC rather than through normal channel. (We first learned of this exchange of messages on Tuesday, 11 February, just prior to the time Steakley was calling on you.)

d. It would take a minimum of 48 hours, and more likely 72 hours, to get the SAC U-2 aircraft organized, airborne, and to the Philippines. It appears, therefore, that action must have been taken at least by Saturday, 8 February, to crank up the mission.

e. Collateral information from clandestine sources indicates that there was some contact with Eastman Kodak for the immediate shipment of control stock film as well as consideration of processing the film in substandard facilities at March Field.

f. Steakley would not tell us the name of the person with whom he coordinated the Vance memo in the State Department. It was probably Joe Scott since Alexis Johnson is in Canada.

State, USAF, NRO reviews completed

- 2 -

g. We do not know whether the Vance memo was coordinated at the White House, although there is some indication that Mike Forrestal may have approved it for Bundy. In this connection, we understand that Alexis Johnson and Mac Bundy are both extremely upset about the handling of this matter and intend to take it up at Special Group this afternoon.

h. In the meantime, however, we are informed that Steakley is under the impression that SAC has full authority to run the operation from the Philippines as soon as it can be done.

i. Ambassador Stevenson, in a very sensitive message to SecState on 12 February, in reporting the arrival of the three U-2 aircraft and seven crews, anticipated that the Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Clark Field would report the arrival of these aircraft to the Department of National Defense and possibly to the Foreign Office, and pointed out that a press leakage was distinctly possible. He stated that President Macapagal was scheduled to arrive there on the 13th, that he hoped to see him on the 14th, and requested instructions. We have no knowledge of any outgoing instructions.

j. You should bear in mind that Ambassador Lodge has recommended that the South Vietnamese broad area coverage, even though over friendly territory, be conducted covertly insofar as the South Vietnamese are concerned. The operation has been approved on this basis.

2. For your private information, the conclusions are inescapable -- we are in identically the same situation as I went through with Gilpatric on 12 October 1962, and as has been previously tried by SAC in the Taiwan Straits coverage [redacted]

3. I recommend strongly that you hop all over this this afternoon and get a clear-cut, unequivocal decision by Special Group

25X1

25X

- 3 -

that no, repeat no, implementing actions for U-2 coverage will be initiated without prior approval of Special Group and that in such approval the entire problems of overt or covert, cover plans, third country base facilities, etc., be thoroughly spelled out.

4. Attached is a blind memorandum which could have been prepared here or in State or in the White House or even in an internally hostile element of the Pentagon, posing a number of presently unanswered questions.

/s/

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Original - DCI
1 - DD CI

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM

1. Yesterday afternoon Colonel Steakley (of JRC), on behalf of Deputy Secretary Vance, circulated a Memorandum for Members, 5412 Board, dated 11 February 1964, signed by Secretary Vance.
2. This morning Washington received a message indicating that the Ambassador and General Maddux, and other U. S. authorities had no prior knowledge whatsoever of the arrival of SAC U-2 aircraft in the Philippines. Grave concern was expressed over the political aspects of this.
3. According to the Vance memo, the operations for which these flights are stated to be required are in support of a plan that has been in existence for many weeks, if not months (COMUS MAV Op Plan 34A). In the approval of that plan, was any specific requirement for U-2 flights established in support thereof?
4. If no such requirement was established, then prior planning was inadequate or something new must have entered the operation which would require such extraordinarily urgent approval. What was it?
5. At the time Steakley was circulating, the planes had apparently already arrived in the Philippines or close thereto. This indicates clearly that considerable prior planning (for at least 48-72 hours) must have been going on unilaterally without consultation with other appropriate Executive agencies. Why?
6. There does not appear to have been any consideration of the sensitivity of bringing three U-2 aircraft and seven crews into the Philippine Islands for undisclosed operations. In addition, this sensitivity is not even considered in the Vance memo. Why?

- 2 -

7. There is no discussion as to whether these flights are to be covert or overt -- are they to have military markings with military pilots, or are they to have no markings and "civilian" pilots? If they are to be military aircraft with military pilots, has a policy decision been made that the United States would now conduct its reconnaissance over denied or hostile territory openly as a military effort?

8. If the flights are to be covert, then what cover plan is to be used in event of aircraft mishap under varying conditions?

9. If, according to the Vance memo, one flight should be sufficient, why are three aircraft and seven crews being deployed to the Philippines?

10. There are probably other unanswered questions which have been lost sight of at the moment, but one cannot avoid the impression that this whole operation was a fly-by-night exercise with totally inadequate prior planning, with totally inadequate consideration of all the factors involved, with no sensitivity to the U. S. political arena vis-a-vis the Philippines, Indonesia, etc., and could only have been generated for reasons much broader than anything justified by the single flight mentioned.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. On 12 February Congressman Clarence Long (Democrat of Maryland) called from Baltimore to speak to General Carter. Since General Carter was at the morning intelligence briefing at that time and went directly from there to USIB, I returned Mr. Long's call to explain and see if I could be of any assistance.
2. Congressman Long said that the daughter of one of his constituents had been held by the Czechoslovakian Government and the family had not seen her for about 15 years. He stated that some time ago he succeeded, after eleven months, in convincing the Czech Government to release the girl and that the Czech Ambassador, Dr. Karel Duda, had assisted him in the matter. Mr. Long said that he and Dr. Duda had not been in contact after completion of the negotiations for release of the girl, but that now Dr. Duda had invited him for lunch at La Salle Du Bois on Thursday, 13 February. He said that one of his assistants suggested that Dr. Duda might want him to intervene in the Cuban fishermen matter -- the Czechoslovakians are representing Cuba in this connection.
3. Mr. Long explained that he is on the Armed Services Committee and he does not want anyone to get the wrong idea about his lunching with Dr. Duda. He therefore wished to advise the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and CIA of his plans; he also wondered whether CIA would be able to give him some background information on the Cuban fishermen problem. He commented that since Dr. Duda had helped him, it was hard for him to be as standoffish as he ordinarily would be under such circumstances. He stated he couldn't imagine what Dr. Duda could think he could do about

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

the situation, and I replied that perhaps he only wants a sympathetic ear. In any event, I said I would have either Larry Houston or John Warner get in touch with him to provide some background prior to his luncheon with Dr. Duda the following day.



H. Knoche

25X1

Distribution:

- ✓Original - DDCI
- 1 - OGC/LC
- 1 - EA/DDCI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. On 11 February I called Lt. General James L. Richardson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, regarding the assignment of [redacted] to CIA. I reminded General Richardson that in July 1963, [redacted] was assigned to CIA for a one-year period; that we subsequently requested that [redacted] be extended until July of 1965; that a response from General Richardson indicated that since the Department of the Army had an important command assignment in store for [redacted] his extension could only be for six months.

2. I advised General Richardson that [redacted] interest in what his command assignment was to be led him to visit his old outfit, [redacted]. He determined that there must have been some sort of a bureaucratic snafu, since he learned that his next job was to head a 12-man military detachment.

3. I stated that we have been pressuring [redacted] to stay on for a year and he would be delighted to do so if we could get the edict changed. General Richardson immediately said, "It is approved right now." He stated he was angry, since this was no way to treat CIA or [redacted] himself. I commented that [redacted] is a crackerjack officer and doing a superb job, that he is a natural for the Soviet military estimates in which we are now heavily embroiled. General Richardson repeated, "He is approved to stay with you until 1 July 1965."

[redacted]
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Distribution:

✓Original - DDCI
1 - AD/NE

CONFIDENTIAL

5 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: NRO and CORONA Management

1. Attached as Tab A is a memorandum dated 21 December constituting Wheelon's report on CORONA management. In order to get a feel of the facts, I commend it again to your attention.
2. Attached as Tab B is a copy of the Fubini proposal, with which you are familiar.
3. Attached as Tab C is Dr. Wheelon's recommendation on the handling of the Fubini proposal.
4. Attached as Tab D is the recent correspondence of February 4th from Dr. McMillan proposing a meeting with you to discuss his present practices and his meeting with the President's Board.
5. McMillan's memorandum to the Directors of Program A and Program B (attached in Tab D) is a good stopgap until such time as final decision is made on CORONA management. I think you will find Dr. Wheelon's views in both Tab A and Tab C as persuasive and compelling.
6. We are presently scheduled to meet with you Monday afternoon at 2:00 p.m., to include Dr. Wheelon, Bross, Sheldon, myself, and Colonel Ledford, to discuss this entire matter. This will be a purely CIA meeting.
7. I have asked Dr. McMillan to meet separately with you and me either Monday or Tuesday and in the event this cannot

- 2 -

be arranged, to have him make a private appointment with you for the purposes he discussed in Tab D. In this latter event, I would urge strongly that you make no commitments to McMillan but to find out exactly what he has in mind.

MSC/hlp

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Attachments

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
<input type="checkbox"/>	UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/>	CONFIDENTIAL
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<i>SSC</i>		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <i>SSC File Copy</i>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
<input type="checkbox"/>	UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/>	CONFIDENTIAL
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SECRET

64-1008

7 February 1964

Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dear Cy:

Pat Carter tells me that you were responsible for laying on my special aircraft for our return from Europe and I want you to know how much I appreciate this.

In addition to the security aspects of some of the documents we were bringing back with us, it gave me abundant opportunity to consult with members of my staff who came over on the aircraft and to get myself fully briefed on activities over the past two weeks.

We all have troubles of varying degree and you have eased many of mine by this plush treatment.

With my thanks again.

Sincerely,

John A. McCone
Director

Distribution:

Orig - Adse (by hand)
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER (via Ex Dir)

MSC:bec (31 Jan)

(Original carbons inadvertently destroyed in O/DCI after dispatch of original to addressee; these copies made up from steno notes.-- bec)

~~TOP SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

Handle Via Indicated Controls



25X1

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

.....

~~TOP SECRET~~